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If history matters for organization theory, then we need greater reflexivity regarding
the epistemological problem of representing the past; otherwise, history might be
seen as merely a repository of ready-made data. To facilitate this reflexivity, we set
out three epistemological dualisms derived from historical theory to explain the
relationship between history and organization theory: (1) in the dualism of explana-
tion, historians are preoccupied with narrative construction, whereas organization
theorists subordinate narrative to analysis; (2) in the dualism of evidence, historians
use verifiable documentary sources, whereas organization theorists prefer con-
structed data; and (3) in the dualism of temporality, historians construct their own
periodization, whereas organization theorists treat time as constant for chronology.
These three dualisms underpin our explication of four alternative research strategies
for organizational history: corporate history, consisting of a holistic, objectivist nar-
rative of a corporate entity; analytically structured history, narrating theoretically
conceptualized structures and events; serial history, using replicable techniques to
analyze repeatable facts; and ethnographic history, reading documentary sources
“against the grain.” Ultimately, we argue that our epistemological dualisms will
enable organization theorists to justify their theoretical stance in relation to a range
of strategies in organizational history, including narratives constructed from docu-
mentary sources found in organizational archives.
Organization theorists increasingly agree
that “history matters,” both for understanding
ourselves (Brown & Härtel, 2011) and for under-
standing organizations (Sydow, Schreyögg, &
Koch, 2009). New institutionalists in particular
have continually affirmed the importance of his-
tory for understanding organizations (Tolbert &
Zucker, 1983: 36). But even new institutionalists
have a tendency to become ahistorical (Suddaby,
Foster, & Mills, 2014), and organization theorists
in general tend to share the general social sci-
entific skepticism toward archival narrative his-
tory (Sewell, 2005: 225). It has even been sug-
gested that consulting organizational archives
is “not properly a method of empirical organiza-
tional research because data and information
are collected, rather than being directly gener-
ated in the course of the organizational re-
search” (Strati, 2000: 133-134). Or history is re-
garded as prosaic storytelling, with the
implication that we can relax our critical, skep-
tical faculties when reading history (Down,
2001), and historical narratives can simply be
incorporated to illustrate theoretical arguments.
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Organization theorists have yet to acknowl-
edge the implications from historiography, as
“the writing of history and the study of historical
writing,” that there are many different kinds of
history (Jordanova, 2006: 228). The “historic turn”
(McDonald, 1996; Sewell, 2005: 81–82) has opened
a dialogue between the humanities and wider
social sciences, including organization theory
(Booth & Rowlinson, 2006; Clark & Rowlinson,
2004; Wadhwani & Bucheli, 2014; Zald, 1996). But,
to paraphrase Hayden White (1987: 164), a lead-
ing philosopher of history, if we are going to turn
to history, we need to have a clear idea of the
kind of history we mean and whether it can
accommodate our values as organization theo-
rists. According to White, “The function of theory
is to justify a notion of plausibility” (1987: 164).
Therefore, we need a theoretical stance that can
justify the plausibility of any history we con-
struct from historical sources; otherwise, the
possibility for a conversation with historical the-
ory will be precluded by a “common sense” def-
inition of organizational history. Without a the-
oretical stance, organization theorists may be
seen as unwelcome tourists, “wandering around
the streets of the past” (White, 1987: 164) looking
for a set of data. Or, as Kuhn put it, history needs
to be seen as more than merely a repository for
“anecdote and chronology” (1970: 1).
In order to reflect on what we mean by “orga-
nizational history,” we need to have a better
idea of the varieties of history that are feasible
for organizational research and writing. Philos-
ophers of history have highlighted the variety of
history as a response to what Paul Ricoeur calls
the epistemological “problematic of the repre-
sentation of the past” (2004: xvi). According to
Chris Lorenz (2011), the epistemological prob-
lems for history mainly concern the status of
narrative, the nature of evidence, and the treat-
ment of time. Responding to this problematic, in
the first part of our article we propose three
epistemological dualisms—that is, different
ways of “knowing” the past that tend to differ-
entiate historians from organization theorists.
These dualisms explain the reluctance of orga-
nization theorists to research and write narra-
tive history derived from primary documentary
sources found in organizational archives.
In the dualism of explanation, historians are
preoccupied with the epistemological problems
of narrative construction, whereas organization
theorists subordinate narrative to analysis. In
the dualism of evidence, historians use narra-
tive history derived from eclectic but verifiable
documentary sources, whereas organization
theorists prefer data constructed from replicable
procedures. And in the dualism of temporality,
historians continually construct periodization
from sources and historical contexts, whereas
organization theorists tend to treat time as con-
stant or else import periodization as given from
historiography. These dualisms provide a tem-
plate that we can use to assess alternative strat-
egies for historical research and writing.
In the second part of the article, we use our
epistemological dualisms to identify and ana-
lyze four alternative strategies for research and
writing organizational history derived from or-
ganizational archives: corporate history, con-
sisting of a holistic, objectivist narrative of a
named corporate entity; analytically structured
history, in which conceptually defined struc-
tures and events are narrated, such as Chan-
dler’s (1962) accounts of structural reorganiza-
tion; serial history, using replicable techniques
to analyze repeatable facts; and, finally, ethno-
graphic history, derived from reading sources
“against the grain” in order to recover practices
and meanings from organizations. These four
strategies illustrate the variety of research that
is feasible using historical sources generated by
organizations themselves. This serves to counter
what we see as the reluctance to use “organiza-
tional archives” in organization studies, which
is not to say that organizational history can only
be written using such archives. But in our view
organizational archives are not only underuti-
lized for constructing data in organization stud-
ies; as documentary sources, they also represent
evidence that remains largely unexplained by
organization theory.
This article thus contributes to organization the-
ory by identifying a range of theoretical stances in
relation to organizational history. We also set out
the epistemological problems that organization
theorists need to consider when deciding how to
construct, incorporate, or analyze historical narra-
tives derived fromarchival sources. From our epis-
temological dualisms, organization theorists will
be able to articulate why it is that history matters,
and from our research strategies for organiza-
tional history, they will be able to answer the
question “What kind of history am I writing?” or
“What kind of history am I reading?”
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HISTORICAL THEORY AND
ORGANIZATION THEORY
There have been repeated calls for more his-
tory in management education (Cummings &
Bridgman, 2011; Madansky, 2008; Smith, 2007;
Van Fleet & Wren, 2005) and a historical per-
spective in organization theory (Aldrich, 1999;
Bucheli & Wadhwani, 2014; Kieser, 1994; Üsdiken
& Kieser, 2004; Zald, 1993). Stager Jacques (2006:
44) has argued that “historically informed theo-
rizing” requires a more rigorous approach to
historical methodology. But historiography has
yet to receive the same systematic analysis in
organization theory as, for example, theorizing
from case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989), process
(Langley, 1999) or narrative (Pentland, 1999) data,
and other interpretive approaches (Prasad &
Prasad, 2002). While those using these approaches
occasionally incorporate historical data con-
structed from organizational archives, they re-
main skeptical toward historical narratives, and
these approaches are not predicated on the kind of
dialogue with historical theory that we propose.
We cannot look to practicing historians for a
guide to historically informed theorizing in the
same way that we might look to practitioners in
other disciplines. History in general is more “craft-
like” than the social sciences, which means that
explicit theoretical or methodological statements
are not necessarily required for historical writing
(White, 1995: 243), especially for narrative history.
There is indeed a long-standing “resistance to the-
ory” from practicing historians (Lorenz, 2011: 15–16;
see also Fulbrook, 2002: 25). But in the relatively
separate field of historical theory, the implicit the-
oretical assumptions that underpin the “craft” of
history have been explicated, either to provide
legitimation for accepted historiographical prac-
tice or to critique it (e.g., Clark, 2004; Jordanova,
2006; Lorenz, 2011: 15).
From the outset, we recognize that dualism is
implicit in history. According to Hegel, “The
term History unites the objective with the sub-
jective side, . . . it comprehends not less what
has happened, than the narration of what has
happened” (1956, quoted in White, 1987: 11–12). It
is generally accepted, therefore, that history
covers “(1) the totality of past human actions,
and (2) the narrative or account we construct of
them now” (Walsh, 1967: 16, quoted in Callini-
cos, 1995: 4; see also Sewell, 2005: 327). As a
result of this “double meaning,” we can make a
distinction between ontological theories that re-
fer to “history as an object” and epistemological
theories concerned with “knowledge of that ob-
ject” (Lorenz, 2011: 20). Organization theorists
tend to assume that a theory of history refers to
the ontology of history, whereas historical theo-
rists are generally more concerned with the im-
plications of historical epistemology. So to say
that “history matters” in organization theory
usually means that past human actions are seen
as ontologically significant for path dependence
(e.g., Sydow et al., 2009). Equally, it could be said
that “history matters” epistemologically for un-
derstanding how the past can be known or rep-
resented, either directly, through organizational
research and writing, or through historiography.
Previous proposals for historical research in
organization studies (Goodman & Kruger, 1988;
Kieser, 1994; Lawrence, 1984) have been predi-
cated on a definitive, unitary statement of his-
torical method. But we maintain that alternative
strategies for research and writing organiza-
tional history need to be located in relation to
the range of ontological, epistemological, and
methodological assumptions identified by his-
torical theory (Lorenz, 2011). As a starting point,
our three epistemological dualisms locate orga-
nization theory in relation to historiography.
Dualism 1: Explanation (Narrative
and Analysis)
The renewed interest in history from new in-
stitutionalists (Rowlinson & Hassard, 2013;
Suddaby et al., 2014; Suddaby, Foster, & Trank,
2010) is associated with increasing attention to
actors and agency in institutional work (Law-
rence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009) and in institu-
tional logics (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury,
2012). New institutionalists recognize the diffi-
culty of restoring a role for actors and agency
without reverting to “powerful, heroic figures”
who can transcend institutional constraints
(Lawrence et al., 2009: 3). Similarly, theoretically
oriented historians and sociologists, following a
self-conscious logic that posits “intentionality,
contingency, and meaningful human action”
(Lorenz, 2011: 21), are mindful that they risk li-
censing a resurrection of the “great man” theory
of history (Sewell, 2005: 316). This is the unstated
default theory for most historians who claim
they “have no time for theory” (Fulbrook, 2002:
125). A shift of emphasis from structure to
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agency is associated with a return to narrative
in historiography (Stone, 1979; see also Fulbrook,
2002: 53), although historians recognize that the-
oretically informed history is supposed to “avoid
narrative” in favor of “thematic analysis” (Ev-
ans, 1997: 152).
Following the example of Giddens (1984: 355–
363) in historical sociology, a convergence in
relation to the dualism of action and structure
could be held as evidence that there is no logi-
cal or methodological schism between organi-
zation theory and history: organization studies
are, or can be, historical, and vice versa, and
therefore organizational history simply refers to
a unified field. However, from the historians’
side, it would be difficult to see such a synthesis
as anything but another imperialistic incursion
into history (Evans, 1997: 182). Furthermore, the
ontological dualism of action and structure
should not be conflated with the epistemologi-
cal dualism of narrative and analysis in expla-
nation, not least because, according to Ricoeur
(1990: 197), structural history often turns out to be
a narrative of quasi-characters such as nations,
classes, or organizations intentionally pursuing
their own interests.
The objections to narrative construction have
been rehearsed by such historical theorists as Al-
lan Megill, who has argued that the “scientistic
form of anti-narrativism” prevalent in social sci-
ence insists on “the language of law and theory,
not the language of narrative” (2007: 68–69; see
also Sewell, 2005: 225). Whether or not organiza-
tion theory can be characterized as anti-narrativ-
ist, major organizational research programs, such
as organizational ecology, are “formally probabi-
listic” (Hannan & Freeman, 1989: 40) and mostly
expressed in a theoretical rather than narrative
form. This is not to say that narrative and proba-
bilistic reasoning are mutually exclusive, since
they can offer complementary accounts of the
same phenomenon (Megill, 2007: 126).
Popper argued that history is concerned with
“the causal explanation of a singular event,”
whereas for “theoretical sciences, such causal
explanations are mainly means to a different
end—the testing of universal laws” (2002/1957:
133). Similarly, but from a completely different his-
torical perspective, the classicist Paul Veyne as-
serted that we can treat a fact as an event “be-
causewe judge it to be interesting,” or we can look
for its “repeatable nature” as a “pretext for discov-
ering a law” (1984: 3). In organization theory, nar-
rative explanations of singular historical events
are usually seen as stepping-stones toward the
development of generalizable theories (cf. Eisen-
hardt, 1989; Langley, 1999), and even supposedly
idiographic case studies are seen as a vehicle for
identifying “generative mechanisms” (Tsoukas,
1989). Popper (2002/1957: 90), of course, was clear
that the “method of generalization” holds little
interest outside of theoretical sciences, and it is
not the kind of history he wished to write. But that
does not preclude the use of general theories in
the construction of narratives to explain singular
events. There is no reason why theories of organi-
zation, such as new institutionalism, should not be
promoted more widely for constructing narrative
organizational histories.
Narrative history also faces what philoso-
phers of history call the “impositionalist objec-
tion,” according to which “recounting the past in
the form of a story inevitably imposes a false
narrative structure upon it” (Norman, 1998: 156;
see also Carr, 1998). The resistance to writing up
qualitative social science research in a narra-
tive form (Riessman, 2011: 314) derives from the
impositionalist objection to narrative. Martin,
for example, consciously “avoids narrative
structure and other forms of textual seduction”
in her writing (1992: 25). Taking more account of
agency and meaning in organization theory, as
in new institutionalism, has led to increasing
recognition that narratives are amenable to de-
construction (Boje, 1995) or analysis as data
(Barry & Elmes, 1997; Hardy & Maguire, 2010;
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 240; Pentland, 1999).
Organization theorists also recognize the onto-
logical status of narrative as constituting ob-
jects, or “artifacts” (Venkataraman, Sarasvathy,
Dew, & Forster, 2013), that “enable and con-
strain” individuals and organizations (Pentland,
1999: 721). But since narrative analysis takes sto-
ries as the “object of investigation” (Riessman,
1993: 1), it has, if anything, reinforced the impo-
sitionalist objection to narrative construction in
organization theory.
Unfortunately, the default position for craft
historians can be characterized as a form of
objectivism, or “historical realism,” where his-
tory is seen as an “untold story” that exists in-
dependently and prior to being discovered and
told by the historian (Norman, 1998: 155). Peter
Novick’s acclaimed history of objectivity in the
American historical profession starts with an
outline of “objectivism” rather than objectivity
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itself. Objectivism consists of “a commitment to
the reality of the past, and to truth as correspon-
dence to that reality; a sharp separation be-
tween knower and known, between fact and
value, and, above all, between history and fic-
tion” (Novick, 1988: 1–2). Objectivists assume
that historical facts exist “prior to and indepen-
dent of interpretation,” and “whatever patterns
exist in history are ‘found,’ not ‘made’” (Novick,
1988: 1–2). Objectivist history is clearly inimical
to the kind of reflexivity that would be required
to counter the impositionalist objection to narra-
tive through a self-conscious account of the the-
oretical and methodological assumptions that
underpin its own narrative construction. Objec-
tivism therefore provides a convenient straw-
man for critics of historical practice (e.g., Barrett
& Srivasta, 1991; Munslow, 2012), and objectivist
history unwittingly supplies the kind of narra-
tive that is amenable to analysis as “rhetorical
history” (Suddaby et al., 2010).
Organization theorists (e.g., Hardy & Maguire,
2010: 1368) and historical theorists (e.g., Ful-
brook, 2002) share a minimal definition of narra-
tive, derived from narrative theory (Cobley,
2001), as a sequence of logically and chronolog-
ically related events organized by a coherent
plot. This does not mean that events have to be
presented in chronological order, and a simple
chronological sequence of events is often seen
as insufficient to constitute a narrative, being
described as a “chronicle” (White, 1987: 17) or “a
story without a plot” (Czarniawska, 1999: 63). If
the story consists of all the events depicted and
the plot is the chain of causation linking them
(Cobley, 2001: 5), then the question for historical
narratives is whether either or both the story or
the plot are found or imposed. Historical theo-
rists have focused on “emplotment” in historical
narratives, with the plot determining the selec-
tion of “facts” and the construction of events
from the archives, and an acceptance that the
same “historical facts” can be emplotted in dif-
ferent forms of narrative (Fulbrook, 2002: 8).
Megill has noted that narrative history has
also been criticized for being excessively de-
scriptive (2007: 86) or having too much story and
not enough plot (Czarniawska, 1999: 69). Lang-
ley, for example, acknowledged the value of
narrative for capturing the richness of a context
but argued that research needs to “offer more
explicit theoretical interpretations” (1999: 697).
She therefore cautioned against reliance on nar-
rative in organizational research, because “an
idiosyncratic story” makes for “a rather thin con-
ceptual contribution” (1999: 697). Furthermore,
Langley maintained that the most interesting
narratives are not “purely descriptive. They
know where they are going” (1999: 697).
Megill has attributed the “debasement of ‘de-
scription’” to “hermeneutic naïveté,” which ig-
nores “the hermeneutic insight that all percep-
tion is perspectival” (2007: 86–87). Organization
theorists share the social scientific consensus
that “data are not theory” because theory re-
quires “causal arguments” (Sutton & Staw, 1995:
374; Weick, 1995: 387). Against this Megill has
argued that “every ‘description’ is already per-
meated by ‘theory’” (2007: 87). In particular,
“thick description” of “a context” (Geertz, 1973:
14), purged of plot, represents a form of analysis
in its own right, even if it deliberately lacks
causal argument. From a self-consciously “an-
gular perspective” (Megill, 2007: 110–111), such
as Foucault’s (1977), pure description can be
seen as theoretical. It is also worth noting that
Weber’s (2009) ideal types largely consist of con-
ceptual descriptions rather than causal argu-
ments (Megill, 2007: 233, note 13). If alternative
“styles of theorizing” (Delbridge & Fiss, 2013) are
accepted in organization studies, then historical
typologies, such as Weber’s ideal types, as well
as clearly articulated perspectives for descrip-
tion in organizational history, are more likely to
be recognized as theory.
Analysis lends itself to the standard format for
a social science article (i.e., introduction, theory,
methods, findings, conclusion), where the theory
section may be presented as a narrative
(DiMaggio, 1995) but not the findings. The “ana-
lytic narratives” proposed by rational choice
theorists (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Wein-
gast, 1998; Pedriana, 2005) and other forms of
“narrative positivism” (Abbott, 1992) tend to
present attenuated narratives, often derived
from narrative analysis, and generally lack the
literary features we usually expect from narra-
tive, such as suspense (Carpenter, 2000; Sewell,
2005: 262–270). The difficulty with making the
mode of emplotment explicit in narrative history is
that in literature the reader usually infers the plot.
Spelling out the plot in the theory section of an
article, or subordinating it to rigorous logic, risks
undermining the literary form of a narrative,
rather like a comedian trying to explain why a
joke is funny before actually telling the joke.
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Dualism 2: Evidence (Sources and Data)
Along with an aversion to historical descrip-
tion, qualitative organizational researchers are
also wary of using historical data. Again, we
can take the example of Langley, who sees “cur-
rent data collected in real time” as “richer and
finer grained” than “historical data collected
through the analysis of documents and retro-
spective interviews,” which she has character-
ized as “sparse and synthetic, focusing on mem-
orable moments and broad trends,” and only to
be used out of necessity in combination with
current data (1999: 693). This is understandable
insofar as Langley associates historical data
with “coarse-grained longitudinal time series”
(1999: 691). We find that organization theorists
refer to “archival data” as if they are an alter-
native to “qualitative research” (Shipilov, 2009:
93), and they assume that “retrospective” re-
search using historical data is quantitative
(Denrell & Kovacs, 2008), so much so that quan-
titative longitudinal studies are seen as synon-
ymous with history (Kipping & Üsdiken, 2008).
Quantitative researchers appear to be more
comfortable using historical sources as second-
ary data, whereas qualitative researchers
clearly prefer primary data that they have con-
structed themselves (Strati, 2000). The qualita-
tive objections to using historical data therefore
provide our focus for exploring the dualism of
sources and data as evidence.
The terms sources and data are often used
interchangeably, but we can make a distinction
between them because it is clear that organiza-
tion theorists prefer what they call primary data
over secondary or historical data, whereas his-
torians prefer primary to secondary sources. The
organization theorist’s secondary or historical
data correspond to the historian’s primary
sources, and the terminological difference is not
purely semantic since it reveals a deeper epis-
temological dualism in relation to the treatment
of evidence and the notion of what constitutes a
cumulative contribution to knowledge.
We can explore the reservations regarding ar-
chival data in organization studies further,
given that with the renewed interest in history
from new institutionalism (Suddaby et al., 2014),
organization theorists have made occasional
forays into archival historical sources for quali-
tative research. But as Rojas illustrates, when
“organizational archives” are consulted, their
“disadvantages” have to be rehearsed in a way
that would not be expected, say, for interviews:
first, “organizations vary in what is saved and
when it is saved”; second, “archives tend to be
rich in documents from leaders, but they have
fewer materials about other actors”; and third,
“actors can selectively record what transpires in
an organization. Meeting minutes, for example,
may address only major points and omit impor-
tant contextualizing discussions” (2010: 1268). As
a result, Rojas argues, “archival sources should
be supplemented, when possible, with newspa-
per accounts, interviews, memoirs, and other
materials” (2010: 1268).
Organization theorists appear to believe that
the “validity and reliability” of documentary ar-
chival sources must be questioned more than
constructed data, such as interview transcripts
(Strati, 2000: 159). As a result, even when they are
used, archival sources are cited sparingly (e.g.,
Rojas, 2010) and are generally relegated to pro-
viding “background information about an orga-
nization” (Strati, 2000: 158) or validating retro-
spective accounts (Golden, 1997), as in most case
studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; e.g., Smets, Morris, &
Greenwood, 2012).
Historians are more likely to rehearse the ar-
gument that, when possible, interviews should
be supplemented with documentary research so
as not “to accept one’s informants’ statements at
face value. . . . Documentary research provides
an excellent means to test the accuracy of dif-
ferent images and perceptions of the organiza-
tion and to compare espoused and actual val-
ues” (Dellheim, 1986: 20). But, more important,
history is equated with the use of primary
sources, produced at the time of the events be-
ing researched (Jordanova, 2006: 95), which
means that the more contemporaneous a source
is with the past in question, the higher its value
for historians (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009: 113).
Even if the distinction between primary and sec-
ondary sources is difficult to justify at a theoret-
ical level, it is indispensable as a “methodolog-
ical rule of thumb” (Megill, 2007: 50). For
historians, retrospective interviews count as
“testimony,” which is notoriously unreliable and
almost by definition cannot constitute a primary
source, especially when it is collected years
later (Megill, 2007: 20, 50). Historians therefore
have a strong preference for “nonintentional ev-
idence,” by which they mean “anything remain-
ing from the past that was not made with the
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intention of revealing the past to us, but simply
emerged as part of normal life” (Megill, 2007: 25,
29; see also Howell & Prevenier, 2001).
Since historians cannot directly observe the
past, they have to reconstruct it, mainly from
documentary sources (Callinicos, 1995: 65). Or-
ganization theorists might argue that organiza-
tional history is no different from other subfields
where constructs are not directly observable.
However, constructs can be inferred from obser-
vations generated in the present, such as re-
sponses to questions. Historians are dependent
on the observations that historical actors have
made, which then find their way into the ar-
chives. With the exception of oral history, which
mainly concerns the recent past, history stands
apart from social science because historians
cannot produce evidence; instead, they have to
find it (Megill, 2005: 456).
From an epistemological point of view, histo-
rians can be seen as “explaining present evi-
dence” (Megill, 2005: 454)—constructing an ac-
count of the past that can best explain the
sources that have been found so far, rather than
explaining the past through the sources (Megill,
2007: 246 note 15). From a historical perspective,
then, the problem is not so much how to gener-
ate theory from organizational archives but,
rather, how to generate narratives or theories
that can explain the sources found in organiza-
tional archives. As part of the explanation for
the extensive archives held by so many organi-
zations, often tended by highly qualified archi-
vists, we need to understand what the philoso-
pher of history Michel de Certeau (1988) called
the “historiographical operation.” In the context
of organizations, this refers to the process
whereby the bureaucratic files are set aside and
transformed into historical “documents,” or, as
an archivist might say, certain “records” are se-
lected for preservation as “archives.”
As Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009: 107) point
out, organization theorists have largely ignored
“source criticism,” which constitutes a rigorous
method for interpreting sources that could coun-
ter the skepticism toward organizational ar-
chives. Source criticism distinguishes between
social “documents” and narrative or literary
“texts” (Howell & Prevenier, 2001: 20–21). As re-
cord-keeping bureaucracies, organizations pro-
duce social documents, such as board minutes
and personnel records, as well as narrative
texts, such as annual reports and in-house mag-
azines, which have been used to examine cul-
ture and change in organizations (e.g., Mills,
2006; Neimark, 1992). Yates’s (1989) historical ac-
count of communication in American manage-
ment from 1850 to 1920 represents an innovative
explanation for the form of evidence found in
organizational archives.
Historians are also used to reading sources
“against the grain” (Clark, 2004: 126; Evans, 1997:
143; Gunn, 2006: 169), inferring a meaning be-
yond, or even opposed to, what the sources were
intended to mean. Even testimony can be “made
to reveal what it doesn’t itself say” (Dray, 1986:
34). As Ginzburg explains in the preface to his
celebrated study of sixteenth-century Italian
popular culture, “The fact that a source is not
‘objective’ . . . does not mean that it is useless. A
hostile chronicle can furnish precious testimony
about a peasant community in revolt” (1992/1976:
xvii). Prohibition can be taken as evidence of
practice. Or, as Boje (2008: 24) puts it, all texts
can be read as “an answer to something,” with
the aim of recovering what the text was an an-
swer to. So when we read in the Bible that Tim-
othy would “suffer not a woman to teach, nor to
usurp authority over the man, but to be in si-
lence,” a historian of Christianity assumes that
there must have been women who were any-
thing but silent (MacCulloch, 2010: 120). Since we
can no longer hear their side of the argument,
we have to reconstruct it from those who si-
lenced them. As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
(1988), the postcolonial theorist, argued, partly
on the basis of research in the archive of the
East India Company, if the subaltern presence
in history is to be recovered, then the silence of
the archives needs to be recognized—what the
sources do not say may be as important as what
they do say (Decker, 2013).
The objections to using organizational ar-
chives can be attributed to confusion over the
nature of sources and how they can be read.
When historians refer to archival sources, they
usually mean the unique, noncirculating social
documents that they have diligently found, often
in an archive that can only be consulted at a
particular location by special permission (Hill,
1993: 22–23). Most social documents bear little
resemblance to narrative literary texts (Evans,
1997: 111). But qualitative organizational re-
searchers seem to assume that historical
sources mainly consist of published narrative
texts, such as books, magazines, and newspa-
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pers (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Historical research
is then equated with a detailed analysis of a
sample of these narrative texts (e.g., Arndt &
Bigelow, 2005; Shenhav & Weitz, 2000), which
can then be treated as if they were constructed
data, such as interview transcripts.
Organization theorists may argue that organi-
zational archives are “collected, processed and
expounded according to the organization’s crite-
ria and for the purposes of social legitimation”
(Strati, 2000: 158). However, this objection ap-
plies more to the narrative texts preferred by
organization theorists rather than to the “nonin-
tentional” social documents produced in the
process of running an organization. We cannot
say that social documents are always more
valuable than narrative sources (cf. Alvesson &
Sköldberg, 2009: 113). Nevertheless, we can say
that a narrative constructed in the first instance
from primary social documents, such as the min-
utes of meetings and their accompanying files,
is less susceptible to incorporating a narrative
from the past as if it were an original historical
narrative of the past. Narrative historical
sources themselves are emplotted—that is, they
tell a story (Zieman & Dobson, 2009: 10)—and
therefore it is difficult to avoid the problem of
“narrative contagion” (Alvesson & Sköldberg,
2009: 115), whereby the plot from narrative
sources is imported into the construction of a
historical narrative. On the other hand, narra-
tive sources, such as periodicals, are more
amenable to the replicable procedures of nar-
rative analysis (Shenhav, 1999) than social
documents. Whether qualitative or quantita-
tive, the use of coding and content analysis
objectifies sources as data and represents an
epistemological attempt to ground historical
interpretation in a systematic analysis of se-
lected texts (Scott, 1990: 32).
Given that, epistemologically, historians are
“explaining the evidence,” it follows that they
are obliged to put their evidence and reasoning
“on the table” (Megill, 2007: 124), and they do this
by following the “rules of verification” (Evans,
1997: 127). Unfortunately, as historical theorists
admit, these rules are “unexplicated” (Fulbrook,
2002: 186), but they are usually manifest in the
copious footnotes that characterize historical
writing (Hexter, 1998). Historical theorists gener-
ally reject the argument that these are merely
“rhetorical devices,” designed to give history a
spurious “reality effect” (Fulbrook, 2002: 56). His-
torians maintain that detailed citations “really
do enable the reader to check the sources on
which a historian’s statement is made and to
whether or not they support it” (Evans, 1997: 127).
They are a hallmark of accepted practices for
historical writing, rather than an actual method
for conducting research. Nevertheless, we must
remember that verification of sources does not
constitute validation of a narrative (Wertsch,
2011: 26), which requires further epistemological
reasoning.
Historians appear to see historical theory and
methodology as being analogous to the plumb-
ing in a building, where the form should conceal
its function (Gaddis, 2004: xi). They assume the
plumbing is there and in good working order,
but they do not want to be confronted with it in
“regular historical works” (Megill, 2007: 150). If
history is to be written in the form of a social
science article for organization theory, then the
plumbing needs to be exposed for inspection.
This means that the tacit practices of “source
criticism” (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009: 107–116)
used to identify and interrogate sources would
have to be made explicit in a dedicated discus-
sion of methods prior to the actual historical
account, instead of being obscured in cryptic
footnotes (Grafton, 1997).
If we accept that there is a “literary” or “fic-
tive” element in all historical (Megill, 2007: 185)
and scientific writing (Bedeian, 1997), then we
can see that it takes different forms. Objectivist
historians still hold to the “fiction of an objective
narrator” (Megill, 2007: 87). But the “rules of ver-
ification” in history preclude the fictionalized
typicality permitted for organizational case
studies, which rest on very different expecta-
tions of verisimilitude where researchers are
less constrained to put their evidence on the
table. As Czarniawska observed, researchers of-
ten present findings for an organization that
“may not exist, and yet everything that is said
about it may be true,” which is taken to mean
that “it may be credible in the light of other
texts” (1999: 38). So in a typical real-time, longi-
tudinal, qualitative case study (e.g., Jarzab-
kowski, Matthiesen, & Van de Ven, 2009), all data
that might reveal the identity of the case study
organization, such as “specific dates, names,
products, and other contextual features” (Jarzab-
kowski et al., 2009: 290–291), are disguised in
order to preserve anonymity. We are assured
that “the nature and temporal sequence of
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events are faithfully reproduced” (Jarzabkowski
et al., 2009: 290–291). However, nothing can be
verified from the actual text of the case study.
To clarify the difference between data and
sources, we can say that organization theorists
often tell us exactly how their data were con-
structed for case studies but offer no clues as to
where the sources for the data are located,
whereas narrative historians generally tell us ex-
actly where their sources are located but give no
indication of how they found or emplotted them. A
typical organizational case study may use ar-
chives, but it is predicated on a “replication logic”
(Eisenhardt, 1989), whereby the procedure for con-
structing the data has to be specified so that it can
be replicated to test the findings in another case
study. In contrast, a typical narrative history is
predicated on a verification logic, whereby the
exact location of sources has to be given so that
they can be consulted to verify whether they sup-
port the historian’s emplotment. A generalizable
contribution to organization theory requires repli-
cable data, even if its fictionalization precludes
verification, whereas a contribution to historiogra-
phy requires verifiable sources, even if it comes in
a literary narrative form without explicit theory or
methods.
Dualism 3: Temporality (Periodization
and Chronology)
Organization theorists recognize that time, or
the timing of events, represents “an important
contingency factor” that is neglected in “cross-
sectional research designs” (Haveman, 1993:
867). The “time elapsed” between specified
events in an organization and the timing of those
events in the “organizational life cycle” allow for
models that “investigate history dependence”
(Haveman, 1993: 867). But these models tend to
equate history with time, which means that even
distant historical settings are chosen because a
complete data set has been found to test the gen-
eralizability of a theory (Haveman, 1993: 869–870),
and not because of questions arising from histori-
ography. As Aldrich put it, in organizational life
cycle models, “‘time’ runs on a universal clock
rather than being historically situated,” which
means that the models “implicitly treat one year
in the 19th century as equivalent to one year in the
20th century. Problems are problems, regardless of
the century in which they are encountered” (1999:
205).
In the treatment of time, therefore, a dualism
can be discerned that separates history from
organization theory. Dates are obviously a hall-
mark of most historical writing, but dating an
event is not only a matter of specifying its tem-
poral relation to other events in the same ac-
count, which could be done by referring to t0, t1,
t2 . . . tn (cf. Langley, 1999; Ricoeur, 1990: 154).
Instead, a date can substitute for a more de-
tailed account of the historical context, which is
taken as given depending on the assumed back-
ground knowledge of readers (Dray, 1986: 28). In
addition, particular years, such as 1865, 1945, or
1968, resonate in national collective memories.
Saying that time matters is not the same as
saying that history matters. Time often matters
for social scientists only in terms of specifying
the chronological order of events in an account
of processes such as path dependence (Abbott,
2001; Pierson, 2004), whereas history matters to
historians for an understanding of events in
their historical context (Tosh, 2008). Time in or-
ganization theory is therefore generally ab-
stracted as clock time, or “analytic time” (Pedri-
ana, 2005)—that is, as a consistent measure for
the sequencing of events. But the historical con-
text is attenuated and can be chosen without
regard to its salience in historiography or col-
lective memory. Historians generally take it as
given that events are embedded in what sociol-
ogists call “temporal and spatial contexts” and
in “particular social times and places” (Abbott,
1997: 1169).
The dualism of temporality differentiates
chronology, where physical time is taken as con-
stant, from periodization, where divisions of so-
cial time and space are defined from sources
and historiographical context in the process of
research and writing. As part of his effort to
make organization theory more historical, Al-
drich (1999: 206) suggested the possibility of ex-
tending evolutionary models to take account of
“period effects,” when “historical discontinuity”
has an impact on a population of organizations.
This led him to recognize the difficulty of decid-
ing what constitutes a “period,” especially when
the boundaries between periods consist of
“unique events.” Aldrich neatly summarized the
problem of identifying “discrete segments in
history as ‘periods,’” given that “different ob-
servers view the same events from diverse per-
spectives on their significance” and, in practice,
“period labels” are created on the basis of dif-
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fering “research objectives and working hypoth-
eses” (1999: 207).
When divisions of time and space are not
taken as given, historians face the continual
problem of devising criteria for partitioning the
past into “manageable chunks” (Jordanova,
2006: 107). For a named entity, such as an orga-
nization, there is always the problem of where to
start. It is necessary to distinguish between the
beginning and the origin of an organization. A
“beginning consists in a constellation of dated
events” (Ricoeur, 2004: 139) that can be con-
firmed from the sources, whereas the origin or
birth of an organization is a mythic event that
requires a single, readily identifiable date and,
preferably, an identifiable founder. This illus-
trates the problem that events that come to be
seen as historical, as opposed to mere occur-
rences, are typically “composed of a series of
events,” with the delimitation of a historical
event requiring judgment of what a narrative is
attempting to explain (Sewell, 2005: 260–261).
Moving from narrative to analysis can be facil-
itated by a periodization derived from social
parameters that remain unchanged, such as rit-
uals or structures (Abbott, 2001: 211). But peri-
odization in history cannot be reduced to chro-
nological clock time because it has to take into
account both historical context and historio-
graphical debate.
Organization theorists tend to see “retrospec-
tive case histories” as inherently biased (Van de
Ven, 1992: 181; see also Eisenhardt & Graebner,
2007: 28) and prone to reinforcing the myths that
more disciplined longitudinal analysis can dis-
pel (Hannan & Freeman, 1989: 40). Real-time re-
search may therefore be preferred to historical
research because process outcomes are not
known when the research commences (Van de
Ven, 1992: 181). Teleology cannot be completely
avoided when it comes to writing up real-time
research, but history is distinguished by an in-
evitable irony and teleology because the ending
is usually known at the beginning. For example,
when we start to read a historical account of an
organization, we usually know whether that or-
ganization still exists. “History appears once the
game is over,” as Ricoeur (1990: 157) put it, and
the “retrospective intelligibility” of history can-
not be predicted at the time events occur. For
historians, “temporal distance” is a requirement
for deciding which singular events are historio-
graphically significant beyond the subjective
perceptions of actors (Lorenz, 2011: 31).
Periodization also reflects the ontological
commitment of historians to defining their ob-
ject in time and space, or in a specific historical
context, with the standard subdivisions of histo-
ry’s specializations being defined by period and
geography (Lorenz, 2011). The specification of
the object in historical time and place derives
from an ontologically holistic view of history, in
the sense that history is generally perceived,
albeit with increasing irony, as a “singular, uni-
fied process of development” (Gunn, 2006: 172),
consisting of “the entire human past” that deter-
mines or shapes “the human present and future”
(Sewell, 2005: 327). This holism lends itself to an
epistemological view of history as an unending
accumulation of historically specific knowledge
that can be integrated within a totality, equiva-
lent to the aspiration for a unified theory in
social science. In terms of temporality, therefore,
history produces situated concepts of a period or
an event, whereas organization theory uses
clock time as a chronological measure for se-
quences of predefined events.
RESEARCH STRATEGIES FOR
ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY
From our epistemological dualisms we can
construct a template that counterposes two styl-
ized forms of history at opposite ends of a spec-
trum (summarized in Table 1). On the one hand,
we find a conventional narrative organizational
history, with detailed citations to primary docu-
mentary sources, and a periodization derived
from sources with reference to historiography
and the historical context. On the other hand, we
have historically informed organization theory,
derived from a clearly stated method for con-
structing a chronological data set from histori-
cal sources. Using this template, we can assess
the potential for reconciling epistemological du-
alisms in alternative strategies for historical re-
search and writing.
We have identified four historical strategies
(viz. corporate history, analytically structured
history, serial history, and ethnographic history)
to highlight the potential for producing theoret-
ically informed “organizational history,” by
which we mean the history of organizations as
such, with a focus on individual organizations
rather than fields or populations. Of these strate-
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gies, corporate history and ethnographic history
are already recognized as historiographical
genres, although our analysis underscores their
distinctive characteristics. In addition, we have
constructed the categories of analytically struc-
tured history and serial history, not only for the
purpose of comparison but also to counter the im-
pression that organizational history can or should
be synonymous with any particular strategy.
We have selected two exemplars that illustrate
the limits and possibilities for each of our four
strategies (cf. Langley, 1999: 695). To facilitate a
focused comparison of exemplars, we have se-
lected journal articles (Anteby & Molnar, 2012;
Cheape, 1988; Childs, 2002; Chuang & Baum, 2003;
Freeland, 1996; Jones, 2002; McKinlay, 2002), rather
than books, although in one instance we have
chosen a key chapter from Chandler’s (1962) clas-
sic, Strategy and Structure. The exemplars for our
strategies can be summarized in terms of their
approach to explanation, evidence, and temporal-
ity (see Table 2), which we expand on in the syn-
optic review below.
Corporate History
Organization theorists’ reservations regard-
ing organizational archives are understandable,
given that most research and writing derived
from such archives take the form of corporate
history. We define corporate history as a holistic
objectivist narrative of a named corporate en-
tity. It is holistic in two senses: first, it generally
encompasses the whole history of the entity, or
at least it emphasizes continuity of the entity
from its founding to the present; second, it is
conceptualized as a contribution to the totality
of history, filling an important gap.
The aspiration to produce a holistic continu-
ous narrative for a corporate entity makes it
necessary to search an eclectic collection of
sources, with primary documentary sources
given precedence whenever they are accessible.
Survivor bias favors coverage of successful ex-
isting organizations enjoying relative longevity
and with sufficient sources available. Corporate
history also entails a teleological anticipation of
future success, or occasionally failure, of the
corporate entity. Although sources may be found
that have theoretical significance, almost by
definition it can be said that an organization
is not selected for a corporate history on the
basis of its potential contribution to theory, un-
like an organizational case study (Eisenhardt,
1989). The focus on a named entity, rather than
an event or institution, emphasizes the agency
of a series of named individuals, even if corpo-
rate history transcends the individual agency of
biography. Corporate history therefore repre-
sents the form of organizational history that
most closely resembles a stylized conventional
narrative history, combining narrative with doc-
umentary sources and a periodization derived
from the corporate entity itself.
An important characteristic of corporate his-
tory, from the point of view of historical episte-
mology, is its objectivist narrative literary form,
which constitutes a constraint on the ability or
willingness of historians to provide a reflexive
account of their perspective (Megill, 2007: 103).
We find an inadvertent expression of this con-
straint in a well-known article by the British
economic historian Donald Coleman, who ar-
gued that the only way historians can normally
gain access to the archives held by extant busi-
ness organizations “is to be commissioned to
TABLE 1
Epistemological Dualisms
Dualisms Stylized Narrative Organizational History Stylized Historical Organization Theory
Explanation Narrative of logically and chronologically related
events organized by a coherent plot
Analysis of relationships between concepts and
categories—for example, 2  2 matrices of
variables
Evidence Sources cited from an extensive search of
multiple documents and texts with verifiable
locations in archives; verisimilitude through
verification logic
Data constructed from specified replicable
procedure for analyzing a predefined and
delimited set of sources; verisimilitude through
replication logic
Temporality Periodization of events as defined by actors or
historiography in historical time derived from
historical context and sources
Chronology of predefined regular occurrences, with
sequences measured against clock/analytic
time—for example, event history analysis
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write company histories” (1987: 142). As a result,
Coleman maintained that no matter how “schol-
arly, accurate, fair, objective and serious that
company history is, its content is necessarily
shaped by the need for the author to give his client
something approaching what he wants. And what
he normally wants is a narrative history . . . warts
and all maybe,” but “not a comparison” with other
organizations and “not an analysis” of how the
organization’s “behavior supports or refutes the
theories of X, Y, or Z” (1987: 142). Coleman’s com-
ments reveal an interesting paradox, which is that
the objectivist economic historians who are most
likely to write a commissioned corporate history
are, in many cases, reluctant narrativists who are
most unlikely to be reflexive about questions of
emplotment.
The self-imposed constraints of objectivism
prevent corporate historians from reflecting on
their own imposition of a narrative. This becomes
obvious when considering the role of founders in
corporate history. Most corporate historians would
concur with Schein’s (1985) view that an organiza-
tion is created by a founder whose actions shape
the culture of the organization. But if it is stated at
all in a corporate history, rather than simply as-
sumed, this view is expressed as a self-evident
finding rather than a theoretically contested con-
cept (Martin, Sitkin, & Boehm, 1985). Any discus-
sion of the “founder’s role” as a mode of emplot-
ment in corporate history is precluded by the
objectivist presumption that the plot has been
found rather than imposed. Objectivism is there-
fore a sine qua non for corporate history, and
whether commissioned or not, objectivism con-
strains corporate history from reflecting on the
imposition of a narrative, such as a founder-
centered emplotment, or the possibility of any
counternarrative.
As organization theorists recognize, history
can confer legitimacy on organizations (Linde,
2009: 85; Suddaby et al., 2010; Suddaby & Green-
wood, 2005). The objectivist view is that legiti-
macy is more likely to be secured from a com-
missioned corporate history if it strives for
“objectivity” because “reviewers and the gen-
eral reader are inherently skeptical about the
objectivity and balance in ‘management-sanc-
tioned’ corporate histories” (Campion, 1987: 31).
As a prominent academic historian who wrote a
commissioned history of the Rothschild bank
(Ferguson, 1998b), Niall Ferguson (1998a) made
the point that neither his own reputation nor the
Rothschilds’ would have been enhanced if he
had written a “whitewash.”
Geoffrey Jones, a professor of business history
at Harvard Business School and the author of a
commissioned corporate history of Unilever, the
Anglo-Dutch multinational (Jones, 2005), has
consistently made a distinction between “criti-
cal,” “objective” commissioned histories, such
as his own, and the numerous public relations
company histories, which may be “readable” in
a popular sense but lack “scholarly depth”
(Jones, 2005: v, 323; Jones & Sluyterman, 2003:
113). Jones (2012: 232) also appears to be a some-
what reluctant narrativist, as an advocate of
using archives more critically, including the
construction of databases for hypothesis testing.
For his history of Unilever, Jones (2005: v) was
granted “unrestricted access to archives and
people,” and his reputation appears to have al-
lowed him to stretch the limits of what a com-
missioning organization might expect. He di-
vides his book into two parts. The first part offers
a chronological history, and the second explores
key themes such as brands, human resources,
and corporate culture, which are obviously seen
as replicable and envisaged as a cumulative
contribution to a thematic totality (cf. Jones &
Zeitlin, 2008).
As a by-product of his commissioned history,
Jones’s (2002) article on Unilever’s subsidiaries
in the United States (1945–1980) addresses their
poor performance in relation to theories of mul-
tinational enterprise. There is a discernible nar-
rative in the article, and as an accomplished
historian with the benefit of temporal distance,
Jones is able to reveal information that actors at
the time were not aware of. However, even in the
context of a theoretically informed article—and
presumably with Jones freed from the con-
straints of his commission—there is no discus-
sion of methods such as we would expect in
organization theory. Even though Jones “draws
extensively on the confidential business re-
cords” held by Unilever and claims to provide
“rich new empirical evidence” on “the function-
ing of multinationals” (2002: 438, 478), with copi-
ous citations to internal committee minutes,
memos, and reports, there is no dedicated dis-
cussion of sources.
While Jones deliberately stretched the con-
straints of narrative, Cheape (1988) was distracted
from the conventional concerns of corporate his-
tory while researching his commissioned history
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of Norton, the American manufacturer of grinding
wheels and abrasives (Cheape, 1985). His discov-
ery of “unusual inside data” in the archives con-
cerning the manager of Norton’s German sub-
sidiary from 1937 to 1959 prompted Cheape to
explore the historiography of relations between
business and the Third Reich between 1933 and
1945. Although Cheape’s (1988) article does not
have a recognizable methods section, it does
include a brief account of the author’s approach
to source criticism through an intertemporal
comparison of letters and reports written in Ger-
many before 1942 and those produced for the
manager’s denazification hearings in 1946.
Cheape realized the significance of his find in
the archives from his awareness of the historical
context and historiographical debate over the
role of business in the Third Reich (see e.g. Nic-
osia & Huener, 2004). Business schools and orga-
nization theorists have been criticized by histo-
rians for ignoring this particular debate
(Berghahn, 2004: 139).
Corporate history demonstrates, therefore, the
difficulty of reconciling our epistemological du-
alisms. Jones’s (2002) move toward replicable
thematic analysis is presented as if it is the only
alternative to a common-sense founder-centered
narrative. But thematic analysis tends to sup-
press historiographical debate, such as that
over the role of business in the Third Reich, or
the epistemological significance of contingent
finds in the archives, such as Cheape’s (1988).
Organization theorists might suspect that com-
missioned corporate history lacks balance, and
there is obviously an ideological bias in favor of
particular types of academic historian, such as
economists who see entrepreneurs as central to
economic progress (Church, 1996). It should be
noted, however, that many well-known corpo-
rate histories were not commissioned or autho-
rized and only use sources in the public domain
(e.g., Delamarter, 1986; Pendergrast, 2000). But in
terms of historical theory (e.g., Novick, 1988;
White, 1987), it can be argued that the ideologi-
cal content of corporate history is contained in
its objectivist form and founder-centered em-
plotment, which would be compromised by any
hint of distortion or lack of independence. The
content of the form of corporate history is inim-
ical to explicit theoretical considerations of his-
torical epistemology.
We can see from the discussion above that the
word “objectivity” tends to be used as a polemic
device, with little analysis of its meaning (Me-
gill, 2007: 112). We tend to agree that judging
whether a work of history is objective or not is
“an empty observation” (Novick, 1988: 6). We can,
of course, observe whether a history puts its
evidence “on the table” by following the rules of
verification, as do all of the corporate histories
we have cited, and then assess whether the
sources cited are compatible with the emplot-
ment. Whether or not holism and objectivism
originate from commissioning, they are perva-
sive in narrative corporate history, most of
which is not commissioned. The sheer volume of
corporate history, in books and academic arti-
cles, makes it appear as if only a particular kind
of narrative can be constructed from organiza-
tional archives, one that is of relatively little
interest for organization theorists except as an
object of narrative analysis. In order to dispel
that impression, we need to identify and assess
alternative strategies for using and explaining
the abundant sources available in organiza-
tional archives.
Analytically Structured History
On entering an organizational archive, orga-
nization theorists confront a choice of “whether
to theorize processes within a narrative or
within a generalizing, analytic schema” (Whipp
& Clark, 1986: 17–18). Instead of lapsing into ei-
ther a common-sense founder-centered narra-
tive or an analysis purged of narrative, we pro-
pose that it is possible to situate historical
research and writing “on the bridge between
narrative and analytic schemas” (Whipp &
Clark, 1986: 17–18). A narrative can be conceptu-
alized as analytically structured history prior to
entering an archive. For example, from a “struc-
ture-event-structure perspective,” the periodiza-
tion is derived from the sources, rather than
imposed from an external historical context, and
events in an organization constitute the turning
points between one period and the next, “when
novel elements are introduced and subse-
quently institutionalized in the new structure”
(Whipp & Clark, 1986: 19).
As a classic narrative account of organiza-
tions derived from primary documentary
sources, Chandler’s (1962) Strategy and Struc-
ture can be seen as an exemplar of analytically
structured history, and it remains one of the best
starting points for understanding historical re-
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search in organization theory (Kipping & Üs-
diken, 2008: 113). Chandler’s historical narra-
tives are in no sense holistic corporate histories;
they are instead highly focused and based on a
careful selection of sources. Nevertheless, his
narratives have the literary quality expected
from a well-written corporate history, with an
eclectic range of sources marshaled to construct
a seamless and satisfying narrative and with a
large number of actors named (Stinchcombe,
1990: 109). Although Chandler was no less objec-
tivist than most corporate historians, Strategy
and Structure represents an important break
with corporate history because named corporate
entities are subordinate to concepts.
According to Stinchcombe, if Chandler had
submitted an article on the multidivisional
structure to a leading journal in management
and organization theory, “a page or two about
the histories of Du Point, General Motors, Jersey
Standard, and Sears might have been in the
original draft as motivation, to be cut by the
editors as not science but anecdote” (1990: 104).
But this dismissal of Chandler’s historical nar-
ratives assumes that it was obvious what strat-
egy and structure meant before Chandler pro-
vided historical illustrations for them. An
interesting historiographical question is
whether it was the extended descriptions in
Chandler’s historical narratives that provided
us with the enduring definitions of strategy and
structure. We maintain that Chandler’s narra-
tives established the causal link between strat-
egy and structure, and his long descriptive sec-
tions were not anecdotal but necessary for
constructing these concepts. Chandler’s narra-
tives are thus emplotted by the analytic con-
structs of strategy and structure.
Chandler himself gave few clues as to his
own theory of history or actual working meth-
ods. We have to rely on commentators for an
exposition of his functionalist theory of history
(Mayhew, 2009; Roy, 1990; Stinchcombe, 1990)
and his use of sources (McKenna, 2006), as well
as a close reading of the text itself. Chandler’s
(1962) chapter on General Motors (GM) is proba-
bly the best illustration of analytically struc-
tured history and is the focus for later historio-
graphical debate (Freeland, 1996). Chandler
used a range of narrative or secondary sources
to recount GM’s strategy of diversification up to
1920: “annual and other corporation reports, gov-
ernment documents, magazine articles, and the
few pertinent business histories and biogra-
phies” (1962: viii). He accepted that changes in
strategy can be gleaned from a general survey
of these sources but maintained that “only a
study of a company’s internal business docu-
ments and letters can accurately reveal the de-
tails of structural reorganization” (1962: 380). In
other words, Chandler only used primary social
documents, such as minutes from GM’s board of
directors’ meetings, to narrate an event—the
structural reorganization of GM during 1920
and 1921.
Freeland’s (1996) analytically structured his-
tory starts where Chandler’s narrative leaves
off, with the adoption of the multidivisional
structure by GM in 1921. Freeland (1996: 497)
argues that for most of the forty-year period be-
ginning in 1924, GM did not have “a textbook
M-form,” and he highlights the differences in
operation of what was ostensibly the same
structure in a series of defined periods. Unlike
Chandler, however, Freeland (1996: 493) outlines
his theoretical orientation at length and gives a
brief account of his methods, highlighting his
use of newly available archival documentary
sources, especially the correspondence between
Alfred Sloan and the owners of GM. He ad-
dresses the problem of bias in accounts by ex-
ecutives but argues that their consistency over
time is an indication of reliability. Freeland
presents a sparser linear narrative for GM over
a longer period than Chandler by narrating the
organizational structure as a “quasi-character”
at the expense of named actors or events. Free-
land retains narrativization, but by focusing on
the clearly stated periods between the turning
points, he places much less emphasis than
Chandler on a narrative account of events.
Analytically structured history thus uses ana-
lytic constructs—such as “strategy” and “struc-
ture”—to search archival sources, enabling the
construction of a narrative of structures and
events that may not even have been perceived
as such by actors at the time. Hence, although
analytically structured history retains narrative
as the main form of explanation, it is driven by
concepts, events, and causation, whereas corpo-
rate history focuses on a corporate entity and
leading individuals. Analytically structured his-
tory may draw on secondary sources and narra-
tive texts, but that is not the same as a rework-
ing or an analysis of the narratives already
contained within those sources. Analytically
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structured history is therefore a form of narra-
tive construction from organizational archives,
not merely the reconstitution of a narrative from
narrative analysis. We suggest that historically
oriented theories of organization, such as new
institutionalism, institutional work, and insti-
tutional logics, are amenable to analytically
structured history, with the construction of his-
torical events from organizational archives
providing a potential focus for actors and
agency. Self-consciously emplotted analyti-
cally structured history is also more defensi-
ble than corporate history against objections
to narrative construction.
Serial History
For historical theorists who focus on the epis-
temological status of narrative, serial history
represents a standard alternative to narrative
history (Clark, 2004: 121; cf. Langley, 1999: 691).
Serial history is predicated on finding a series of
“repeatable facts” (Ricoeur, 1990: 106) that can
be analyzed using replicable techniques, usu-
ally in a predefined set of chronologically con-
tinuous sources, if not an actual quantitative
data set. As the preferred strategy for history in
organization studies, serial history constantly
threatens to eclipse narrative—to use Ricoeur’s
(1990) term—through continual advances in such
methods as event history analysis. However,
while serial history does not necessarily pre-
clude analysis of primary social documents de-
rived from organizational archives, such as min-
utes of meetings, these sources would require
laborious processing in order to construct “re-
peatable facts” that could be usable as data.
Secondary data sets may occasionally be found
in organizational archives (Payne, Finch, &
Tremble, 2003), but research using such archival
data makes no real claim to be historical in our
terms (e.g., Dokko, Wilk, & Rothbard, 2009). It is
hardly surprising, therefore, that we have found
little or no serial history that attempts, in our
epistemological terms, to explain the evidence
found in a particular organizational archive.
Hence, these rich sources, which are a mainstay
for corporate history and analytically structured
history, remain largely unexplained by the dom-
inant historical strategy in organization theory.
Serial history mainly focuses on organiza-
tional fields or populations, rather than individ-
ual organizations. Occasionally, as Chuang and
Baum (2003) have demonstrated, data covering
the “life histories” of multiple organizations can
be constructed from the archive of an associa-
tion or a licensing or regulatory organization, as
opposed to the archives of the organizations that
are the object of investigation. Chuang and
Baum compiled data on 557 nursing homes op-
erating in Ontario between 1971 and 1996 from
“two archival sources: the Ontario Ministry of
Health (MOH) licensing records and the Ontario
Hospitals’ Association (OHA) Directory” (2003:
42). They used their data on nursing homes to
test a series of hypotheses regarding the adop-
tion of common names for components of multi-
unit chains. What is interesting from our per-
spective is that although Chuang and Baum’s
serial history represents a valuable contribu-
tion to the growing literature on organiza-
tional name changes, the subordination of
narrative to analysis is such that there is no
discussion of the history of naming for nursery
homes, and the actual names are not revealed.
We are only told whether nursing homes
shared their names with others that identified
them as part of a chain. Finally, Chuang and
Baum appear to have chosen the period 1971 to
1996 for the availability of chronologically
continuous archival sources rather than for
any historiographical significance.
For a more interpretive form of serial history,
“content analysis of archival documents com-
posed of qualitative textual data” (Sonpar &
Golden-Biddle, 2008: 795) can be applied to nar-
rative sources in an organizational archive. As
an example of such serial history, Anteby and
Molnar’s (2012) research stands out for its con-
tent analysis of 309 internal bulletins from the
French aeronautics firm Snecma, covering the
nearly 50 years from 1953 to 1999. Anteby and
Molnar use their data to show how there was a
“structural omission” of contradictory elements
from the firm’s official historical record. This
demonstrates how corporate cultural communi-
cations, such as internal bulletins or company
magazines, represent primary narrative sources
that are amenable to quantitative narrative
analysis in serial history. These sources are part
of an organizational archive since they are
clearly generated by the organization itself. As
Anteby and Molnar (2012: 521) point out, the in-
ternal bulletins they analyzed can reliably be
taken to represent an official view because they
were “approved by Snecma’s top management,”
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which turns the alleged weakness of such
sources into a strength. It is also worth noting
that Anteby and Molnar’s historical research
represents a novel contribution from organiza-
tion theory to the field of collective memory
studies, in which both serial history and organi-
zational history have been neglected (Rowlin-
son, Booth, Clark, Delahaye, & Procter, 2010; cf.
Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, & Levy, 2011).
Ethnographic History
For our final strategy, ethnographic history,
we note initially how organizational ethnogra-
phy has been defined by three criteria: (1) eth-
nographic methods, with a requirement for ob-
servation and “talking to people”; (2) a narrative
form of writing; and (3) an “ethnographic sensi-
bility that would convince the reader of the
trustworthiness of the author” (Yanow & Geui-
jen, 2009: 254). The emphasis on fieldwork and
the construction of data for generating theory re-
flect the need to gain legitimacy in organization
studies (Zickar & Carter, 2010). Nevertheless, we
can deploy the criteria used to define organiza-
tional ethnography to consider its similarities to
and differences from ethnographic history.
Historical researchers obviously cannot be
present, with notebooks, tape recorders, and
cameras, at the events they describe, but occa-
sionally they discover a cache of sources from
witnesses that can “tell us what it was like to be
there” (Stone, 1979: 14). More important, histori-
ans have interpreted cultural anthropology, and
especially Geertz’s (1973) notion of “thick de-
scription,” to mean that culture can be under-
stood as a text (Gunn, 2006: 63), with an empha-
sis on how texts can be read, rather than as a
method for constructing texts. Van Maanen
(1988: 76) has claimed that ethnographers have
to construct their texts from the field, whereas
the texts used by historians and literary critics
“come prepackaged.” Even if it were true that
historical sources came prepackaged, and any-
one who has ever worked on an organizational
archive will know that they do not, it is not clear
why the interpretation of cultures should privi-
lege texts constructed by ethnographers. Be-
sides, historical researchers often enter into re-
lationships with regard to their sources
comparable to those of an ethnographer enter-
ing the field, especially when the documents are
held in the “living archive” of an extant organi-
zation (Hill, 1993: 54; Howell & Prevenier, 2001),
so the contrast with fieldwork may be overdone.
In fact, ethnographic history—also known as
ethnohistory, anthropological history (Green &
Troup, 1999), or microhistory (Clark, 2004: 75–
79)—is now widely accepted by historians, re-
flecting the rise of cultural history (Megill, 2007:
203). The most celebrated example of ethno-
graphic history is the international bestseller
Montaillou, in which Le Roy Ladurie (1980) used
the records of the Inquisition to interpret the
culture of medieval peasants (see Sewell, 2005:
69, and Stone, 1979). As an example of reading
sources against the grain, Le Roy Ladurie
was not so much interested in the Inquisition, or
the nature of the peasants’ heresy, but, rather, in
using the Inquisition’s records as if they were
ethnographic field notes recording peasant
culture.
If we accept that ethnography consists of a
perspective as much as a method, then we can
see that organizational archives contain sources
that can be read as texts for an interpretation of
culture. But in comparison with corporate his-
tory, ethnographic history requires a self-
consciously “angular” theoretical perspective
(Megill, 2007: 110–111). Childs (2002), for exam-
ple, adopts a Bakhtinian (Bakhtin, 1968) perspec-
tive in his account of a gold mine operated by
the British-owned St. John d’el Rey Mining Com-
pany in the Brazilian tropics during the nine-
teenth century. In this account Childs focuses on
a particular ritualized display of power, in
which “on Sundays nearly 1,500 slaves from the
mine, separated by sex, lined up in columns in
front of the Casa Grande (big house) for a cere-
mony called the Revista (review)” (2002: 43). Like
an ethnographer, Childs interprets the meaning
of this ritual as a way to explore broader social
relations between masters and slaves. Follow-
ing Bakhtin’s emphasis on the carnivalesque in
early modern Europe (Gunn, 2006: 68), Childs is
alert to the pride and shame of the slaves and in
particular to any opportunity they took to ridi-
cule their masters.
As a historian, Childs is interested in the his-
torical legacies of slavery and racism in shap-
ing the modern world, which has been largely
neglected in organization theory (Cooke, 2003).
The “industrial slavery” at the gold mine in Bra-
zil involved a seemingly modern organization of
labor, with up to 1,700 slaves, most of them
rented from other slave owners, “working at nu-
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merous individualized tasks as miners, borers,
strikers, surface laborers, carpenters or masons,
but rarely in the large work gangs common to
plantation slavery” (Childs, 2002: 49; cf. Crane,
2013). Childs’ primary sources are from the St.
John d’el Rey Mining Company Archive, held by
the University of Texas at Austin, which Childs
reads against the grain. In response to criticism
in the British press for the company’s use of
slave labor, long after the abolition of slavery by
Great Britain in 1833, the directors of the St. John
Company commissioned an “independent” re-
port on the condition of “the Negroes.” The fifty-
page Circular to the Proprietors of the St. John
d’el Rey Mining Company was sent out to stock-
holders in 1850, assuring them of the “humane
and generous . . . measures already adopted . . .
to render them [the slaves] as contented and
happy as men can be expected to be, whose lot
is to earn their bread by the sweat of their brow”
(quoted in Childs, 2002: 48). The narrative text of
the Circular is one of Childs’ main primary
sources, along with the company’s annual reports
and social documents, such as the minutes of
board meetings. But Childs’ angular theoretical
perspective is nothing like an objectivist narrative
corporate history explaining the longevity or per-
formance of a multinational mining company.
As an ethnographic history, McKinlay’s (2002)
analysis of clerks’ careers in the Bank of Scot-
land before the First World War relies on docu-
mentary sources found in an organizational ar-
chive. But whereas Childs follows Bakhtin,
McKinlay follows Foucault (1977) into the ar-
chives. McKinlay points out that his reading of
the modern banking career is very different from
a “conventional” or corporate history. In his de-
scription of how the clerks were disciplined by
the emerging concept of a career, McKinlay’s
main sources are staff ledgers, in which annual
appraisals were recorded. While searching the
bank ledgers, however, McKinlay found hun-
dreds of drawings hidden in a secret “Ledger
99,” produced by a clerk, Robert Shirlaw, who
worked for the bank from 1899 (aged 16) until his
death in 1930. A talented cartoonist, Shirlaw car-
icatured the bank’s employees and their work
situations, regularly depicting the bank’s man-
ager as Napoleon (McKinlay, 2002: 603, Figure 1).
McKinlay’s analysis brings the clerks’ occupa-
tional world to life with a series of microstories
pieced together from ledgers that illustrate, for
example, the bank’s tight surveillance and con-
trol of behavior.
This returns us to the definition of organiza-
tional ethnography as narrative. Organizational
ethnographers are understandably anxious not
to be constrained by the “succinct textual form”
that prevails in organization studies, and, there-
fore, they emphasize the narrative aspect of
their own writing (Yanow &Geuijen, 2009). But in
the context of history, and in comparison to cor-
porate history, ethnographic history represents
a conscious refusal to impose a plot in a move
toward a “non-event worthy history” (Veyne,
1984: 54), one that is wary of metanarratives and
universalizing theories. With their angular the-
oretical perspectives (Megill, 2007), both Childs
and McKinlay distance themselves from the
metanarratives that emphasize functional or
economic logic in the demise of slavery and the
rise of modern careers. Childs’ account in par-
ticular is thematically structured, exploring, for
example, the role of overtime and religion in the
slaves’ Sunday routines. Routines and rituals of
power are presented as relatively constant
within an extended period, starting with the
commencement of operations by the St. John
Company in the 1830s and ending with the
emancipation of the slaves during the 1870s
(Childs, 2002: 62). Even if written as a microstory,
ethnographic history tends to avoid the implica-
tion that the events recounted are “historical” in
the sense of changing the course of history.
Like much historiography, then, ethnographic
history owes a lot to the serendipity of finding
sources (Ginzburg, 1992/1976: xi; Jordanova, 2006:
37). But ethnographic researchers recognize the
significance of the intriguing sources they find in
organizational archives because they know what
kind of sources they are looking for (McKinlay,
2013). Researchers writing a corporate history
would not normally look for such sources and,
even if they found them, would probably discard
them as a distraction. Recognizing the signifi-
cance of such finds in an archive therefore re-
quires an “ethnographic sensibility” and an “an-
gular” theoretical perspective.
DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated that corporate history,
analytically structured history, serial history,
and ethnographic history are as different from
one another as are other strategies for research
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and writing in organization studies. Therefore, if
history matters for organization theory, it makes
no sense to try to find a unified ontological or
epistemological foundation, let alone a unitary
“historical method” for organizational history.
The epistemological dualisms in explanation,
evidence, and temporality that we set out in the
first part of this article highlight the similarities
and differences between alternative strategies
for organizational history (see Table 3). We have
identified these strategies with the intention of
demonstrating that serial history, with its repli-
cable procedures for constructing data, is not
the only alternative to narrative corporate his-
tory. Ethnographic history also represents an al-
ternative to the narration of historiographical
events in response to the impositionalist objec-
tion to narrative. And analytically structured
history offers the possibility of constructing his-
torical narratives using theories of organization
that can be defended against social scientific
objections to narrative construction.
We have made the case that organizational
archives are not merely an underutilized source
of data; in historical terms they also represent
largely unexplained evidence. The sheer vol-
ume of corporate history, whether commissioned
or not, suggests that many organizations con-
sider this evidence worthy of retention and ex-
planation. However, for the epistemological rea-
sons we have given, we do not believe that we
should leave it to corporate history to explain
the evidence in organizational archives. We
would like to promote greater use of organiza-
tional archives with alternative strategies for
research and writing. This will require episte-
mological reflexivity in order to counter reserva-
tions regarding the use of organizational ar-
chives in organization theory.
We should point out that much material from
organizational archives is in the public domain,
as was the case for several of our exemplars
(Anteby & Molnar, 2012; Chandler, 1962; Childs,
2002; Freeland, 1996), which means that re-
searchers do not need special permission from
an organization before consulting the archives.
However, having gained access to an organiza-
tional archive, organization theorists then need
to know what to look for. Corporate history tends
to follow the narrative embedded in the “con-
ventional hierarchy” of an organizational ar-
chive (McKinlay, 2013), which is partly why cor-
porate historians are unable or unwilling to write
up their theory and methods. Analytically struc-
tured history and ethnographic history, though,
require a degree of epistemological reflexivity, as
is expected from interpretive organization theo-
rists (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009), and which our
epistemological dualisms facilitate.
An understanding of historical theory is also
desirable if organization theorists are to become
more sophisticated consumers of historiogra-
phy, even if they do not intend to conduct archi-
val historical research themselves. It seems un-
likely that an organization theorist would be
commissioned to write a corporate history; nev-
ertheless, corporate histories represent valuable
secondary sources, which offer vicarious access
to a wealth of primary sources. When we read
corporate histories, therefore, we need an appre-
ciation of how they are emplotted by their objec-
tivism and founder-centered narratives.
Epistemological reflexivity is necessary be-
cause, like most nonhistorians who rely on sec-
ondary sources, such as corporate histories, or
prepackaged primary sources (Jordanova, 2006:
38; O’Sullivan & Graham, 2010), organization
theorists often use historiography as if it repre-
sents an unproblematic “historical record.”
Many of the best known histories in organiza-
tion studies, such as The Visible Hand (Chan-
dler, 1977) or Scale and Scope (Chandler, 1990),
are, in fact, masterpieces of historiographical
synthesis, which rely mainly on secondary
TABLE 3
Examples of Research Strategies for Organizational History
Strategies
Dualisms Corporate History Analytically Structured History Serial History Ethnographic History
Explanation Narrative (corporate entity) Narrative (conceptual construct) Analysis Analysis
Evidence Sources Sources Data Sources
Temporality Periodization Periodization Chronology Periodization
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sources, such as corporate histories (Kobrak &
Schneider, 2011). We cannot expect organiza-
tional researchers to refer constantly to their
historical writing as an interpretation of com-
mentaries on the traces of past events. However,
if they did so more often, this would lead to a
greater appreciation of the craft skills required
to interpret primary sources.
A more fundamental concern is that organiza-
tion theorists, compared to theorists from other
fields, have little to say about the significance of
historical events for understanding our present
and future. Take, for example, Sofsky’s “thick de-
scription” of “power in the concentration camp” in
The Order of Terror (1999), which we would char-
acterize as an ethnographic history of an organi-
zational form. Sofsky makes no mention of orga-
nization theory, because organization theory has
little to offer by way of research concerning con-
centration camps (Lammers, 1995). It would be un-
seemly to ask how studying concentration camps
could advance organization theory (Clegg, 2002),
but if understanding the past is central to our
historical human condition (Ricoeur, 2004), then
we should ask how organization theory can help
to explain singular historical events or organiza-
tional forms. In other words, it may be self-
defeating to insist that organization theory is syn-
onymous with the relentless subordination of
idiographic history to nomothetic social science.
A clear conclusion from our epistemological du-
alisms and alternative strategies is that there is
no prospect of a unified field of organizational
history. History is no less fragmented than orga-
nization theory, and historical theorists (e.g., Me-
gill, 2007) are no less suspicious of any attempt to
impose paradigm consensus than organization
theorists (Van Maanen, 1995). Nevertheless, if we
are to realize the potential for a plurality of histor-
ical perspectives in organization theory, we
should consider the prospects for dialogue with
historians, as historical sociologists such as
Sewell (2005) have done. In order to facilitate such
a dialogue, we should try to recognize what it is
that organization theorists know or need to know,
and what it is that historians know or need to
know. Whereas organization theorists need to un-
derstand theory and methods, historians need to
know their historical contexts and sources. There-
fore, we cannot regard historians simply as un-
trained theorists awaiting analysis to replace
their narratives or replicable methods for con-
structing chronological datasets.
We are aware that historians tend to dismiss
theoretical interventions from anyone who has
not “dirtied their hand in the archive” (Fulbrook,
2002: 25), so we should stress that our strategies
are partly derived from reflection on our own
experience of theoretically informed historical
research and writing (Decker, 2010; Hassard,
2012; Rowlinson, 1988). Even though we would
like to encourage organizational researchers to
venture into organizational archives, we recog-
nize that most of us are restricted to examining
the relatively recent past by our preferred meth-
ods, as well as by our limited knowledge of
historical contexts and sources. Only a few or-
ganization theorists have looked at organiza-
tions before the nineteenth century (Kieser, 1987,
1989; Newton, 2004; Ruef & Harness, 2009), and
the further back we go, the more dependent we
are on historiography and an appreciation of
how historians work. Historical sociologists look-
ing at the Reformation (Wuthnow, 1989), for exam-
ple, know they need an appreciation of how his-
torians work with sources if they are going to read
and theorize from historiography.
Finally, we should note that historians now
seem more willing to articulate and share their
knowledge of the craft skills required in organiza-
tional archives (see Adorisio & Mutch, 2013, and
Bucheli & Wadhwani, 2014). McKenna’s (2006) rev-
elations of Chandler’s research in the archives of
General Motors, along with McKinlay’s (2013) in-
triguing account of how he traced the books and
documents ordered by Foucault in the Biblioteque
Nationale, tell us more than Chandler or Foucault
themselves did about their working methods.
However, before we decide to follow Chandler or
Foucault into organizational archives, we need
to know which of their very different kinds of
history best reflect our own theoretical stance,
and for that we need more than a methodologi-
cal toolkit. We have signposted some of the phi-
losophers of history and historical theorists who
can help us to discover our own reflexive theoret-
ical stance in relation to history. Our exposition of
the epistemological dualisms of explanation, evi-
dence, and temporality, as well as our identifica-
tion of corporate history, analytically structured
history, serial history, and ethnographic history as
alternative strategies for research and writing or-
ganizational history, represents a contribution to-
ward mutual understanding among organization
theorists, historical theorists, and practicing
historians.
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